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Network Structure of Insurgent Groups and the Success of DDR 
Processes in Colombia 
We argue that organizational structure of insurgent organizations influences the 
prospects for success in a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process 
(DDR). In concrete, we argue that more cohesive, tighter, networks have higher 
levels of supervision and control on its military units and increase the probability 
of successful DDR processes. In order to evaluate our hypotheses, we use the 
theory of networks to map and characterize the network structure of the United 
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC). Our results suggest that armed military units grouped in 
smaller and more isolated components on the network remilitarize with higher 
probability with respect to other units on the network. Also, we find that military 
units with high degree of centrality on the network play an important role for the 
risk of conflict recurrence and success in a DDR process. 
Keywords: Network structure; insurgent actors; DDR; Colombia. 
Introduction 
Most research on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) focuses on the 
interaction between the government and the rebel group as individual agents, or study 
how ex-combatants’ socio-economic characteristics affect the prospects for 
reintegration to civilian life.1 The first approaches have a clear macro focus, treating 
organizations as unitary actors, while the second type emphasizes entirely the micro-
level, disregarding organizations or relations. Here we focus on an intermediate level 
i.e. the network structure of an insurgent group and its relation to the success of a DDR 
process. By the network structure of an insurgent group we mean the existing links 
between the different military units that together form the rebel group, and by 
successful DDR process we mean the absence of remilitarization of military units of a 
demobilized insurgent group. 
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There are many reasons to believe that the structure of insurgent groups can be 
relevant for the study of civil wars in general and DDR processes in particular. For 
instance, the relative strength of rebel groups, both in their ability to inflict costs on a 
government and the ability to resist government repression, is found to be an important 
determinant of the duration of civil wars.2 Zukerman3 analyzes the structure of the 
recruitment process in rebel groups, and finds that the geography of this process 
determines the probability for organized violence to reappear after the ending of civil 
wars. She classifies armed groups as local or non-local depending on whether they 
recruit people from the same zone where they performed activities or not. She argues 
that regions where all demobilized groups are local have higher probability for 
demilitarization of armed groups over time compared to regions where demobilized 
groups are local and non-local. Yet, none of the previous studies have focused on the 
properties of the rebel group’s network structure per se and its relationship with the 
success of DDR processes. 
Why does the network structure of a rebel group matter for the success of DDR 
processes? We believe that a DDR process can take advantage of the network structure 
to maintain communication and control among demobilized military units and/or ex-
combatants and ensure commitment towards demobilization. Thus, the role of central 
units on the network and the structure of the network itself becomes important. Central 
military units can easily reach and pass information to other units on the network and 
tighter networks have more control over its members. Hence, knowledge about the 
network structure of the insurgent group and the centrality of its military units on the 
network increases the probability of success of a DDR process. 
Mapping the network structure of an insurgent group also allows the 
identification of isolated military units or sub-networks that may need special treatment 
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during the process due to its relative independence from other structures on the network. 
A map of the structure of a rebel group can help reveal salient attributes that must be 
incorporated when designing a DDR process, and indicate how different positions in 
network structures may require different types of treatments and interventions in DDR 
processes. 
In this manuscript, we analyze the network structure of the United Self-Defense 
Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
and the implications for DDR success. For the AUC, we can compare the predictions of 
our theoretical framework with the eventual success in the DDR process underway. For 
the FARC, we do not as of the time of writing have a formal DDR process, but we can 
compare the implications of the network structure for likely DDR success, and compare 
our theoretical predictions with other expert assessments about the likely spoilers in a 
DDR process. 
The AUC and the FARC have different origins and notably divergent network 
characteristics. AUC originates from the self-defense and paramilitary groups that 
emerged in the 1980s, based on the needs of rural landlords and drug cartels to protect 
from extortion by the guerrillas. In the beginning, these groups did not have a strong 
central command, nor a strong or cohesive ideological foundation. Rather, they mostly 
emerged as effective private armies for hire. In fact, not until the late 1997 did these 
self-defense groups coalesce as a more formal organization through the AUC, a united 
group with some command structure and right wing ideology. 
By contrast, the origins of the FARC can be traced back to 1964, when the group 
launched an insurgency against the Colombian government with a self-professed 
communist ideology. From the outset, the FARC was an organized and unified group of 
guerrillas with clear political ideology and a well defined hierarchical structure as stated 
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in the Agrarian Program of the Guerrillas, signed at what was called the First Guerrilla 
Conference in 1964. 
We acknowledge that incentives and opportunities given to ex-combatants 
through a DDR process can modify the subsequent network structure of the group over 
time. However, these benefits and opportunities for ex-combatants do not appear 
immediately after the end of an armed confrontation and will take some years to 
materialize. Thus, we think it is valuable to consider as a first step how the network 
structure existing at the time that an insurgent group decides to end armed confrontation 
may influence the incentives of individual units. 
Networks and the success of DDR processes 
There is a growing body of research on the importance of networks in determining 
social and economic outcomes.4 In general, this literature considers either the role of a 
given network in affecting outcomes, a static problem, or the formation or evolution of 
networks, a dynamic problem. In international relations, for example, network theory 
has been used to understand properties of the structure of international systems and 
interaction patterns,5 the consequences of network structure for conflict and 
cooperation,6 or the evolution of particular networks such as international trade over 
time.7 However, there has been much less attention to networks in the study of domestic 
conflict. 
In this manuscript, we focus on the role of the existing network structure of the 
AUC and that of the FARC into the success of their respective DDR processes. In 
particular, we concentrate on how the network structure affects the probability of 
rearmament of the military units on the network through its capacity for communication 
and supervision on its military units. We argue that more cohesive, tighter, networks 
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have higher levels of supervision and control on its military units and increase the 
probability of successful DDR processes. 
Here, we map the network structure of the AUC and the FARC, and compute 
some basic descriptive statistics associated with the properties of the network as a 
whole. Then, we analyze how these properties affect remilitarization of demobilized 
groups. Our first two hypotheses pertain to the general form of the network of the group 
and their capacity to exert supervision and control on its military units. We believe that 
tighter networks should higher capacity for communication and control over its military 
units in ways that will increase the probability of success in a DDR processes. We are 
implicitly assuming that insurgent groups that participate in DDR processes have 
incentives to genuinely pursue peace. Within a network, more isolated units should be 
more likely to act independently and be less constrained by the central command. We 
analyze how these properties affect remilitarization of demobilized groups by 
empirically testing the following theoretical hypotheses: 
H1: We expect more cohesive insurgent groups to have a lower probability to 
remilitarize because of the greater monitoring capacity and coercive power they can 
exert among their military units. 
H2: We expect isolated military units and smaller components in the network to 
have a higher probability to remilitarize because of the reduced monitoring capacity and 
coercive power that other military units can exert on them. 
To test these hypotheses, we look at the overall clustering coefficient, the mean 
of degree, and the number of components of the network (these concepts are defined in 
the next section). Higher values of the clustering coefficient and of the mean of degree 
imply tighter, more cohesive, networks. With respect to the number of components, a 
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network with more (less) components with respect to another is considered as less 
(more) cohesive. 
The next two hypotheses deal with the position of individual military units on 
the network and their incentives to remilitarize. In particular, we expect to see a process 
of influence or diffusion from central units, as well as higher incentives to remilitarize 
for units that are likely to profit from drug trafficking. 
H3: Military units with high levels of centrality in the network can positively 
affect the success of the DDR process if they do not remilitarize. 
H4: Military units in isolated or smaller components and working on well 
identified areas associated to the drug trafficking business have higher probability to 
remilitarize. 
For assessing H3 we use the betweenness and degree coefficients for each node 
in order to identify the most central nodes in the network. If the resulting central 
military units in the network do not remilitarize, then, we expect that military units in 
their same network components do not to remilitarize. 
For assessing H4 we consider the characteristic of each military unit of the rebel 
groups operating in zones that are well known to be related with drug production or 
drug trafficking. Then we calculate the assortative coefficient for different attributes of 
each military unit. We expect networks with higher assortative coefficients on drug 
production/trafficking to be more likely to remilitarize. 
Theoretical Framework 
We use network theory to map the network structure of the AUC and the FARC. The 
theory of networks provides a set of concepts and techniques for analyzing the structure 
of relations between different individuals or groups. The establishment and graph 
visualization of such relations among the members of a specific structure allows, for 
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example, to identify informal communication channels, substructures within a larger 
structure, as well as members, which may be of key strategic importance within the 
structure due to their privileged location inside it. A network is composed of a set of 
nodes, representing the analysis units that make up the structure under study, and of a 
set of links that connect such nodes, representing the relationships among them. Links 
may indicate, if necessary, the type or direction of a relationship (unidirectional or 
bidirectional), or even be weighted by a specific factor indicating the relative 
importance of that relationship within the total set of possible relationships. 
Formally, a network is represented by a graph ܰ	 ൌ 	 ሺܰ, ࢍሻ, where ܰ	 ൌ
	ሺ݅ଵ, . . . , ݅௡ሻ is a set of nodes and ࢍ is an ݊	ݔ	݊	adjacency matrix on the set of nodes. 
Each entry, ݃௜௝ in the adjacency matrix indicates the relationship between nodes ݅, ݆. If 
݃௜௝ ് ݃௝௜ then the network is directed and if ݃௜௝ ൌ ݃௝௜ then the network is undirected. In 
our case, nodes represent military units of the insurgent groups. Military units are 
understood as operative groups that perform military actions within a defined territory. 
According to this definition, and restricted by the relevant information to map the 
network, we consider blocks as the relevant military unit for the case of the AUC and 
Fronts for the case of the FARC. In each case these are military bodies that gather 
together multiple columns, smaller military units, and have relative independence 
within the general command and control structures. This independence suggests, in 
addition to non-supervised relationships among them, that they can play role as spoilers, 
a relevant characteristic to be consider when dealing with DDR.8 
The links on the inferred network represent existing communication between the 
two military units connected. We refer to them as links of shared departmental presence. 
We register a link of shared departmental presence between two nodes if both 
performed military activities in the same territory. Even if military units may be 
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associated with or originally confined to specific geographical territories, the existing 
data on their military activities also reveal that many units in practice often attack in 
different places in different departments. We assume that if two units are present in the 
same territories then this implies that there must be some minimum level of 
coordination to perform military duties. Such active cooperation in turn implies 
information flows in both directions between the two nodes. In other words, a link of 
shared departmental presence between two nodes ݅ and ݆ implies a bidirectional 
relationship where information flows both from ݅ to ݆ and from ݆ to ݅. 
Density measures  
Density measures are relevant to the extent that they can affect the information 
transmission process or the capacity to enforce and monitor behaviors between the 
network. 
Clustering is a measure of the frequency with which transitive relationships 
between nodes exist in a network ܰ	 ൌ 	 ሺܰ, ࢍሻ. Transitivity means that if node ݅ is 
linked to node	j, and ݆ is linked to ݇, then ݅ is linked to ݇. 
The clustering coefficient of node ݆, ݈ܿሺ݆ሻ is defined as: 
݈ܿሺ݆ሻ ൌ ∑ ݃௜௞		݇∈	݆ܰሺ݃ሻ,݅∈	݆ܰሺ݃ሻ,്݇݅∑ ݃௜௞݃௝௜݇∈	݆ܰሺ݃ሻ,݅∈	݆ܰሺ݃ሻ,്݇݅	
		 
The index calculates the existing number of connected triads over the total 
number of possible triads on the network. 
The average degree on a network give us some idea of the density of the 
connections in a network and is calculated as ∑ ݀௜ሺࢍሻ/݊௜ , which is just the average of 
the degree of all nodes on the network. 
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Centrality Measures 
The degree of a node is the number of connections that a node has with other nodes in a 
network. The degree of a node ݅, ݀௜ሺ݃ሻ, is the number of neighbors that ݅ has in the 
network ܰ	 ൌ 	 ሺܰ, ࢍሻ, so that ݀௜ሺ݃ሻ 	ൌ |	 ௜ܰሺࢍሻ	| where ௜ܰሺࢍሻ 	ൌ 	 ሼ݆	|	݆݅	 ∈ 	݃ሽ denotes 
the neighbors of a node ݅. Betweenness help us to gain intuition about how central a 
military unit is. It measures for each pair of other military units on what fraction of the 
total number of shortest paths between the two the given military unit lies. It is defined 
as:  
ܾݐሺ݇ሻ 	ൌ 	 ∑ ݃௜௞௜௝:௜ஷ௝,௞∉ሼ௜,௝ሽሺ݊	 െ 	1ሻሺ݊	 െ 	2ሻ/2 
Individual Characteristics  
Here we are interested in measures related to how links that we observe depend on other 
idiosyncratic characteristics of the nodes. In our case, we are interested in measuring to 
which extent links between military units depend on the fact of performing activities in 
well recognized regions affected by drug production/trafficking activities. 
The assortativity coefficient measures to what extent nodes in a network connect 
with other nodes because of having the same individual characteristic. For instance, it is 
common in social networks that nodes become more likely to connect to each other 
because they share the same attributes. Formally, the assortativity coefficient is the 
Pearson correlation coefficient of the degrees at either ends of an edge and ranges 
between [-1, 1].9  
Data 
Information about demobilized blocks of the AUC as well as other relevant 
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characteristics such as the size of each block, in terms of combatants, and the 
geographical areas where they operated is taken from Oficina del Alto Comisionado 
para la Paz [Office of the High Commissioner for Peace].10 Information about 
remobilized blocks comes from Zukerman.11 
For the FARC, we rely on two main sources of information; the Centro Nacional 
de Memoria Histórica, CNMH [National Center for Historical Memory]12 and the 
Observatorio de Procesos de Desarme, Desmobilización y Reintegración, ODDR 
[Observatory of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Processes].13 
The CNMH, based on the bylaws of the FARC, a document published by the 
guerilla itself, makes the ideological foundations of the guerilla explicit, and defines the 
organizational structure, command regime and duties and rights of combatants. In terms 
of information, one of the more valuable resources extracted from the Bylaws is the 
hierarchical structure of the FARC, which is centered on the head of the Central Major 
State (CMS) and its secretariat, and defines the structure of sub-ordinate units and chain 
of command that should be followed by the military corps of the guerilla.  
On the other hand, the information on departmental presence of the FARC in 
2012 was obtained from monitoring, studying, and applied analysis of the testimonies of 
demobilized individuals, institutional sources, communications, and war reports 
published by the guerilla, as well as the revision of media through the Sistema 
Actualizado de Información, SAI [Updated Information System], carried out by the 
ODDR. This is the only study with disaggregated information for the FARC at the level 
of individual fronts, our unit of analysis. The information available is discriminated by 
hierarchical structures, and there are in total records of presence in 30 departments of: 7 
blocks, 73 fronts, 18 columns, 31 companies, 1 mobile block, and 1 unit. 
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Results  
Network Structure and Remilitarization of the AUC  
We start by testing hypotheses H1 and H2, arguing that more cohesive insurgent groups 
should be less likely to remilitarize and that more isolated military units and smaller 
components in the network have a higher probability to remilitarize. Figure 1 shows the 
network structure for the AUC, based on the attribute of shared departmental presence 
for their military units as explained above. 
 
Figure 1. AUC’s shared departmental presence network (gray nodes indicate 
remilitarized military units) 
 
 
 
A visual inspection of the graph tells us that the network is composed by 8 
components of different sizes. This suggests a not-so-tight network, despite the 
principal component having 24 of the total 39 blocks on the network. This observation 
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is corroborated by the overall clustering and mean degree coefficients reported in Table 
1. 
Table 1. Clustering and mean degree statistics regarding in the AUC’s shared depart- 
mental presence network. 
Network  Global clustering Mean degree 
AUC's shared departmental presence network 0.78 8.62 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
The clustering coefficient, which takes the value of 0.78, indicates a not-so-tight 
structure among blocks on the network. Additionally, the mean degree of the network is 
just 8.62, a lower value when compared with that of the FARC, as we will show later. 
Based on these statistics we would expect high levels of remilitarization for the AUC. 
Information about the remilitarized blocks of the AUC is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. AUC’s remilitarized blocks. 
AUC's Block  Block label 
Bloque Heroes de Tolová  11 
Bloque Libertadores del Sur  13 
Autodefensas Campesinas de Meta y Vichada  15 
Bloque Pacífico  16 
Bloque Centauros  17 
BCB Vichada  19 
Bloque Tolima  20 
BCB Martires de Guatica  22 
Bloque Vencedores de Arauca  23 
Bloque Andaquies  29 
BCB Sur del Putumayo  30 
Heroes del Llano y Guaviare  33 
Heroes del Llano y Guaviare  34 
Bloque Élmer Cardenas - Turbo   37a  
Bloque Élmer Cardenas - Ungia   37b  
Bloque Élmer Cardenas - Necolí   37c  
Bloque Catatumbo  6 
Bloque Calima  7 
Bloque Cordoba  8 
Bloque Suroeste Antioqueño  9 
Source: Zukerman (2016) 
 
According to this information, 20 out of the total 39 blocks of the AUC, 
corresponding to 51%, remilitarized. Altogether, this results provide evidence in favor 
of H1, stipulating that low levels of cohesion among blocks on the network are 
associated with higher risks of remilitarization. 
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We also find evidence supporting H2 by looking at the number of isolated or 
grouped in smaller components on the network that remilitarize. We find that 12 out of 
the total 15 blocks in isolated or smaller components eventually have remilitarized, 
corresponding to a rate of 80%. 
We now turn to the role played by central military units on the network within 
the success of the DDR process by testing H3, positing that more central military units 
increase the success of the DDR process if they do not remilitarize. Table 3 reports 
basic descriptive statistics of centrality for each military unit. 
Table 3*. Centrality statistics regarding the AUC’s shared departmental presence 
network. 
AUC's Block  Block label 
Overall   
bidirectional 
degree 
Overall   
simple 
degree 
Betweenness 
centrality 
BCB Nordeste Antioqueño   21  26  13  120 
Autodefensas  Campesinas  del  Magadalena  Medio  ‐ 
Puerto Triunfo   28  26  13  81 
Bloque Norte   32  18  9  80 
Bloque Élmer Cárdenas ‐ Necolí    37c   22  11  42 
Bn Front Hector Julio Peinado   31  4  2  22 
Autodefensas Campesinas de Meta y Vichada   15  6  3  2 
Bloque Centauros   17  6  3  2 
Bloque Cacique Nutibara   1  18  9  0 
Bloque La Mojana   10  10  5  0 
Bloque Héroes de Tolová   11  4  2  0 
Bloque Héroes de Monte de María   12  8  4  0 
Bloque Héroes de Granada   14  18  9  0 
Bloque PacÍfico   16  6  3  0 
Bloque Noroccidente Antioqueño   18  18  9  0 
BCB Vichada   19  2  1  0 
Autodefensas Campesinas de Ortega   2  4  2  0 
Bloque Tolima   20  2  1  0 
BCB Mártires de Guática   22  6  3  0 
Bloque Vencedores de Arauca   23  4  2  0 
Bloque Mineros   24  18  9  0 
Autodefensas  Campesinas  del  Magadalena  Medio  ‐ 
Puerto Boyacá   25  2  1  0 
BCB Sur de Bolivar   26  8  4  0 
Bloque Resistencia Tayrona   27  6  3  0 
Bloque Bananero   3  18  9  0 
Héroes del Llano y Guaviare   33  6  3  0 
Héroes del Llano y Guaviare   34  6  3  0 
Cacique Pipintá   35  6  3  0 
Autodefensas Campesinas del Casanare   36  4  2  0 
Bloque Élmer Cárdenas ‐ Turbo    37a   18  9  0 
Bloque Sur del Magdalena   4  2  0 
Bloque Cundinamarca   5  2  1  0 
Bloque Catatumbo   6  2  1  0 
Bloque Calima   7  6  3  0 
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Bloque Cordoba   8  4  2  0 
Bloque Suroeste Antioqueño   9  18  9  0 
Source: Zukerman (2016) 
*The reported statistics were calculated without the isolated nodes present in the network structure. 
 
Table 3 and Figure 1 reveal that blocks 21, 28 and 32 have the highest centrality 
measures and to be located on the main component of the AUC’s network structure. 
Interestingly, neither of these blocks remilitarized nor most of the military units in the 
same component. Only 8 out of the 24 blocks in the same component, corresponding to 
33%, eventually remilitarize. Further, when looking at the graph, one could argue that 
most of the 8 blocks that remilitarized are located at the periphery of the network, where 
less control can be exerted. These findings provide support in favor of H3. 
Finally, according to H4, military units in isolated or smaller components and 
working on well-identified areas associated with the drug trafficking business are more 
likely to remilitarize. Table 4 lists the departments with a history of high coca 
production. We use this information to identify military units located on well-identified 
areas associated with drug production and trafficking. Figure 2 presents a map including 
drug trafficking business characteristic for the military units. 
 
Table 4. Coca production-related departments. 
Departments  
Nariño  
Putumayo  
Caquetá  
Cauca  
Guaviare  
Meta  
Antioquia  
Chocó  
Vichada  
Bolívar  
Córdoba  
Norte Santander 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ‐UNODC. 
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Figure 1. AUC’s drug production/trafficking and shared departmental presence network. 
(Gray nodes indicate military units in areas with drug production) 
 
 
As it can be seen from Figure 2, most of the remilitarized blocks of the AUC are 
located precisely in areas associated with drug trafficking business, and are linked to 
other military units with the same characteristic. We find that 15 out of the total 20 
blocks that remilitarized, 75%, are located in areas associated with drug trafficking 
business. We also compute the assortativity coefficient for three different characteristics 
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of the nodes, i.e., drug production/trafficking, type of recruitment and remilitarization, 
and find that the first of these attributes exhibits the greater assortativity coefficient, 
0.58. This means that military units on the network tend to link more to other units 
sharing the drug production/trafficking characteristic. This finding provides support in 
favor of H4. 
Network Structure and the Possible Remilitarization of the FARC  
Figure 3 shows the network structure for the FARC, based on the shared departmental 
presence attribute for their military units as explained above. 
Figure 3. FARC’s shared departmental presence sub-network.
 
Figure 4. FARC’s Shared departmental presence sub-network color codes.14
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Again, we start with a visual inspection of the graph in Figure 3. This time the 
graph tells us that the FARC’s network is composed by only 4 components, and the 
biggest component includes almost all of the military units. This suggests a more 
cohesive network. The overall clustering coefficient of the network is 0.92, and this 
corroborates the conclusion that this network is tighter than the AUC network discussed 
previously. Thus, based on H1, we should expect less remilitarization for the FARC 
after an eventual DDR. 
Even though there has not yet been a DDR process with the FARC, we can 
evaluate the model prediction against information about the FARC’s fronts themselves 
and resistance to the actual peace negotiations as well as expert testimony on the 
possible fronts that may act as spoilers of the peace process.15 With regards to the latter, 
the Colombian newspaper El País has published a list of 13 fronts considered to be the 
most likely spoilers in a worst case scenario, displayed in Figure 5. 
Figure 5. FARC’s potential dissidents. 
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Source: El País.16  
 
We note that even if this worst case scenario were to materialize only 18% of the 
fronts of the FARC would remilitarize. This is consistent with our prediction that FARC 
units would be more robust to remilitarization than the AUC, and we conclude that is 
consistent with what we would expect from H1. 
When looking at the fronts in smaller components of the network and its 
probable remilitarization there seems to be no support in favor of H2, as only 3 out of 
the list of 13 dissident fronts are located on smaller components. However, there are at 
least 4 other fronts of the dissident list located at the periphery of the network (fronts 
30, 57, 1 and 6) where it is expected to be less control and coercive capacity. Moreover, 
the existence of a hierarchical links between nodes should be taking into account. To 
see this, we include the hierarchical structure of the FARC in the network and obtain 
what we called the complete network of the FARC, see Figure 6. This complete 
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network includes both the shared departmental presence and the organizational 
hierarchical structure of the group. If we include this hierarchical relationship between 
military units then there are no isolated agents or smaller components any more. Thus, 
although several units are located at the periphery of the network, the hierarchical links 
may be much stronger than the link of shared departmental presence for these peripheral 
military units. 
 
Figure 6. FARC’s full network.17 
 
 
We now turn to the role of central nodes within the success of an eventual DDR 
process with the FARC. Table 5 reports the centrality measures for the military units in 
the network of shared departmental presence of the FARC. 
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Table 5. Top ten centrality statistics regarding the FARC’s shared departmental 
presence network. 
FARC's front 
Overall 
bidirectional 
degree 
Overall 
simple 
degree 
 Betweenness 
centrality 
Frente 25  58 29 1462 
Frente 5  66 33 1350 
Frente 3  20 10 1078 
Frente 49  22 11 507 
Frente 34  22 11 448 
Frente 4  22 11 342 
Frente 39  58 29 144 
Frente 44  58 29 144 
Frente Reinaldo Cuellar  58 29 144 
Frente 2  16 8 141 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
We find that fronts 25, 5 and 3 have the highest centrality measures. According 
to H3, these three fronts are relevant for the success of a hypothetical DDR process if 
they decide not to remilitarize. Unfortunately, Fronts 5 and 3 are listed as dissident 
fronts. This result highlights the tension between hierarchy organizational and shared 
departmental presence type of links. In fact, agents such as front 25 allow processes of 
transmission of information to be carried out among military-type agents without 
incorporating restrictions coming from the chain of management of the guerrilla.  
However, different links can have variable influence, and we acknowledge that 
the final predictions about the risk of remilitarization could differ depending on the 
particular weights that are assigned to different links. For instance, we appreciate that 
the degree to which the organizational structure of the FARC is capable of exercise tight 
control over its sub-ordinates could also depend on different factors such as the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of the leaders and their ability to motivate individual 
recruits and enhance collective morale. Thus, if the influence of the hierarchical 
relationship between nodes by far overwhelms the relative weight of the shared 
departmental presence, then we would expect to see a lower risk of remilitarization. 
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Finally, we identify military units that are located on well identified areas 
associated with the drug trafficking business and map them into the network. The result 
of this exercise is presented in Figure 7. It can be seen from the figure that most of the 
fronts located in areas associated with the drug trafficking business are linked to others 
with this same attribute. In fact, the assortativity coefficient when considering drug 
production/trafficking as the relevant characteristic is 0.67. This means that drug 
production/trafficking is a critical issue for the success of an eventual DDR process. If 
most of the central nodes decide to accept and stand by the negotiations then we would 
expect most other units also not to remilitarize. 
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Figure 7. FARC's drug production/trafficking and shared departmental presence 
network. 
 
(Black nodes indicate military units with complete presence in areas with drug 
production, grey nodes indicate military units with partial presence in areas with drug 
production and white nodes indicate military units with no presence in areas with drug 
production.) 
 
 
Conclusions  
We have highlighted the importance of analyzing the network structure of an insurgent 
group in order to understand the prospects for success in DDR processes and the 
specific cases where the challenges are likely to be more severe. We map the network 
structure of the AUC and the FARC and explore the relationship between some basic 
characteristics of their network structures and the success of DDR processes. We find 
that armed military units grouped in small size components or located at the periphery 
of the network remilitarize with higher probability with respect to other units. We 
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identify military units for each group with high degree of centrality and analyze their 
role on the success of the DDR process. We also find that military units located on areas 
related to drug production/trafficking require special attention considering that units 
sharing this characteristic have a high probability to remilitarize. Although it is difficult 
to predict, especially about the future, we believe that the findings presented for 
observed recidivism for the AUC attest to how the predictions of the model provides 
insights for the possible challenges in a DDR process involving the FARC.  
Notes 
1. Humphreys and Weinstein, “Demobilization and reintegration.” 532. 
2. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, “It Takes Two”; Staniland, Networks of 
Rebellion. 579 – 586. 
3. Zukerman, Organized Violence. 
4. Jackson, Social and Economic Networks. 
5. Brams, “Transaction flows”; Schofield, “A topological model.” 
6. Cranmer, Menninga, and Mucha, “Kantian Fractionalization”; Kinne, “Multilateral 
Trade.” 
7. Brams, “Trade in the north area”; Kinne, “Network Dynamics.” 
8. The detailed organizational structure of the FARC is in CNMH, Guerrilla y 
población civil. 82. 
9. For details see Newman, “Assortative Mixing in Networks.” 1. 
10. Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, Proceso de Paz. 
11. Ibid.; Zukerman, Organized Violence. 106 – 109. 
12. CNMH, Guerrilla y población civil. 76 – 82. 
13. ODDR, “Presencia de Organizaciones Guerrilleras.” 5 – 15. 
14. The category Affiliate to more than two blocks, in the color codes, indicates fronts 
that in the same year were present in at least two areas under the control of different 
blocks. 
15. El País, “Disidencias.” 
16. Ibid.; El país, “Disidencias.” 
17. The complete network of the FARC involves 944 connections, out of which 868 are 
reciprocal and 76 are non-reciprocal. Also, at least 12 double connections are 
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evident, which are relationships of shared departmental presence between military-
type agents with more than one common zone of operation. 
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Appendix 
Table 6. AUC’s Blocks 
Block Label 
Bloque Cacique Nutibara  1 
Autodefensas Campesinas de Ortega  2 
Bloque Bananero  3 
Bloque Sur del Magdalena  4 
Bloque Cundinamarca  5 
Bloque Catatumbo  6 
Bloque Calima  7 
Bloque Córdoba  8 
Bloque Suroeste Antioqueño  9 
Bloque La Mojana  10 
Bloque Héroes de Monte de María  12 
Bloque Héroes de Tolová  11 
Bloque Libertadores del Sur  13 
Bloque Héroes de Granada  14 
Autodefensas Campesinas de Meta y Vichada  15 
Bloque Pacífico  16 
Bloque Centauros  17 
Bloque Noroccidente Antioqueño  18 
BCB Vichada  19 
Bloque Tolima  20 
BCB Nordeste Antioqueño  21 
BCB Martires de Guática  22 
Bloque Vencedores de Arauca  23 
Bloque Mineros  24 
Autodefensas campesinas del Magadalena Medio -  Puerto Boyacá  25 
BCB sur de Bolívar  26 
Bloque Resistencia Tayrona  27 
Autodefensas Campesinas del Magadalena Medio - Puerto Triunfo  28 
Bloque Andaquies  29 
BCB Sur del Putumayo  30 
BN Front Héctor Julio Peinado  31 
Bloque Norte  32 
Héroes del Llano y Guaviare  33 
Héroes del Llano y Guaviare  34 
Cacique Pipintá  35 
Autodefensas Campesinas del Casanare  36 
Bloque Élmer Cárdenas - Turbo   37a 
Bloque Élmer Cárdenas - Ungia   37b 
Bloque Élmer Cárdenas - Necolí   37c  
Source: Zukerman (2016) 
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Table 7. FARC’s fronts I 
Front Label 
Frente Vladimir Stiven   ven    
Frente Aurelio Rodríguez   uez    
Frente Esteban Ramírez   rez    
Frente Camilo Torres   res    
Frente Manuela Beltrán   ran    
Frente Vaupés   pes    
Frente Mario Vélez   lez    
Frente Reinaldo Cuellar   lar    
Frente Acacio Medina   ina    
Frente Manuel Cepeda Vargas   gas    
Frente Policarpa Salavarrieta   eta    
Frente Abelardo Romero   ero    
Frente Víctor Saavedra   dra    
Frente Urías Rondón   don    
Frente Felipe Rincón   con    
Frente 66  66 
Frente 63  63 
Frente 62  62 
Frente 60  60 
Frente 59  59 
Frente 58  58 
Frente 57  57 
Frente 56  56 
Frente 55  55 
Frente 54  54 
Frente 53  53 
Frente 52  52 
Frente 51  51 
Frente 49  49 
Frente 48  48 
Source: ODDR (2012) 
 
 
Table 8. FARC’s fronts I I 
Front Label 
Frente 47  47 
Frente 45  45 
Frente 44  44 
Frente 43  43 
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Frente 42  42 
Frente 41  41 
Frente 40  40 
Frente 39  39 
Frente 38  38 
Frente 37  37 
Frente 36  36 
Frente 35  35 
Frente 34  34 
Frente 33  33 
Frente 15  15 
Frente 13  13 
Frente 10  10 
Frente 9  9 
Frente 8  8 
Frente 7  7 
Frente 6  6 
Frente 5  5 
Frente 4  4 
Frente 3  3 
Frente 2  2 
Frente 1  1 
Frente 32  32 
Frente 16  16 
Frente 31  31 
Frente 30  30 
Frente 29  29 
Frente 28  28 
Frente 27  27 
Frente 26  26 
Frente 25  25 
Frente 24  24 
Frente 22  22 
Frente 21  21 
Frente 20  20 
Frente 19  19 
Frente 18  18 
Frente 17  17 
Frente 14  14 
Estado Mayor Central  EMC  
 Estado Mayor Central del Bloque Caribe   EMCBCaribe  
 Estado Mayor Central del Bloque Central   EMCBCentral  
 Estado Mayor Central del Bloque Magdalena   EMCBMagdalena  
 Estado Mayor Central del Bloque Noroccidental   EMCBNorocc  
 Estado Mayor Central del Bloque Occidental   EMCBOccidental  
 Estado Mayor Central del Bloque Oriental   EMCBOriental  
 Estado Mayor Central del Bloque Sur   EMCBSur  
Source: ODDR (2012) 
 
